the WTO and selection by the IOC, considering the seemingly enormous investment opportunities for their clients, it seems odd that the mood of American law firms with China in mind is only "cautiously optimistic," according to John Ford, vice president of the U.S.-China Business Council. 6 The past three decades have seen the influx of foreign investment in China, in which U.S. lawyers have played crucial roles. While their clients are partying with Chinese landlords, the lawyers are still lingering at China's doorway, trying hard to receive an official invitation to be invited in. "It was a bit like studying the moon: [y]ou could see it, but you couldn't get there," recalled Professor Jerome Cohen, who engineered the Coudert Brothers' Beijing office, the first foreign law firm to have a foothold in mainland China since the Communist takeover. ' China has earned a reputation of "being inhospitable to foreign business," 8 but has been much more suspicious of foreign lawyers. Tight regulations for foreign law firms operating in China has sparked a firestorm of debate. To some extent regulation is justifiable because in China, the practice of law is to a large extent still a public function.' For one thing, western lawyers can by no means possess the national loyalty and shared cultural values, which are still prerequisites, though not literally, of the socialist regime.'" Nevertheless, how much leverage does a sovereign state like China have in regulating foreign access into its legal market? Is there a minimum international standard that universally applies to regulation of domestic legal markets? How should sovereign nations like China cope with the right to regulate and the duty to grant access? This article will explore the international rules governing trade in legal services, specifically the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), briefly discuss the Chinese WTO Secretariat, countries that maintain a nationality requirement in relation to the provision of legal services appear to do so to protect a "public function" performed by host-country practitioners involved in the practice of host-country law, particularly in relation to representation associated with a right of audience in the courts of host jurisdictions. See id.
See WTO SECRETARIAT, GUIDE TOTHE GATS: AN OVERVIEW OFISSUES FOR FURTHER LIBERALIZATION OF TRADE IN SERVICES 407 (2001). According to
10. See, e.g., Zongze Gao, President, All-China Bar Association, speech at the WTO on the China Legal Profession Conference (transcript, available at http://www.chineselawyer .com.cn/article/show.php?cId=736) (last visited Aug. 30, 2002) . Zongze Gao stated that one of the achievements in Chinese legal market is the emergence of an echelon of lawyers of higher political consciousness and professional caliber, whom the Community Party and the people trust. See id.
[Vol. 13:1 regulatory regime regarding foreign law firms, and offer an historical review of the inroads that American law firms have made into the Chinese legal market. The article will conclude by gauging the potential impact that China's accession to the WTO is likely to have on China-oriented American law firms.
f1. GATS AND TRADE IN LEGAL SERVICES
As the "first ever set of multilateral, legally-enforceable rules covering international trade in services,"" GATS received much controversial publicity.' 2 Trade in services was included in the multilateral General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations only upon the reluctant agreement of many developing countries. 3 Because a large share of trade in services takes place inside national economies, 4 the nature of the services makes any international body of law like GATS more intrusive than other trade legislation. 5 For the same reason, critics have claimed that liberalization under GATS means deregulation of services, 6 and as a result governments pay a high price from losing the right to regulate,'" threatening democracy." 8 On the other hand, proponents of international cooperation in liberalizing trade in services criticize that too much flexibility in scheduling services makes GATS systematically an ineffective vehicle by which to liberalize trade in services.' 9 Still no substantial improvement of market access has been achieved because most commitments merely preserve existing regulatory measures. 20 WTO (2001) , available at http:// www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatise/'tifte/agnn5_e.htm (last visited Sept. 28. 2002) [hereinafter Trading into the Future].
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See generally GATS -Fact and Fiction, available at http://www.wto.org/english/
A. GATS: Liberalization or Deregulation?
Negotiated in the Uruguay Round, 21 GATS covers all internationallytraded services with two exceptions. 22 Like the agreements on goods, 2 3 GATS operates on three levels: (1) the main text containing general principles and obligations; (2) annexes dealing with rules for specific sectors; 24 and (3) individual countries' specific commitments to provide access to their markets.' Unlike the agreement on goods, GATS has a fourth element showing which countries are temporarily not applying the "most-favorednation" (MFN) principle of non-discrimination. 26 MFN treatment under GATS directly parallels the centrally important Article I of the GATT. 27 Article I[ of GATS provides that "with respect to any measure covered by this Agreement, each Member shall accord immediately and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favorable than that it accords to like services and service suppliers of any other country. 28 Article II further establishes a general obligation which is in principle applicable across the board by all Members to all service sectors, regardless of whether the member has undertaken specific commitments in a sector. 29 This provision requires a country allowing foreign competition in a service sector, to give equal opportunities in the sector to service providers from all other WTO members.
However, under GATS, any member can also apply for a one-time temporary exemption from MFN by listing a service sector in the Annex on Article H1 Exemption. In order to protect the general MFN principle, such 21 . See Trading into the Future, supra note 11. The Uruguay Round negotiation was launched in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in September 1986, and the Final Act embodying the results of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations was signed by ministers in Marrakesh on April 15, 1994. See id. The Final Act is 550 pages long and contains the legal texts, which spell out the results of the negotiations including those on legal services. See id.
22. See Fact and Fiction, supra note 12, at 1. The two exceptions are "services provided to the public in the exercise of governmental authority and, in the air transport sector, traffic rights and all services directly related to the exercise of traffic rights." Id.
23. See Trading into the Future, supra note 11, at 14. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) deals with trade in goods. The text of GATT 1947 has been amended and incorporated into the new WTO agreements and known as " GATT 1994 exemptions are only made once and must be taken at the time the negotiations were concluded." Exemptions last for not more than ten years and are subject to review after not more than five years (in 2000)." Subsequently, any future requests for exemptions from Article 11 are only granted under the waiver procedures of the Marrakesh Agreement. 3 In other words, an MFN exemption would give a Member who had made no commitments in a sector considerable freedom to discriminate. 3 Therefore, in such cases, a Member may accord treatment more favorable than the minimum standard to some Members, as long as all Members receive at least that minimum standard of market access and national treatment appearing in its schedule. 4 This automatic extension of any bilaterally or multilaterally negotiated privileges amongst WTO members creates classic free-rider concern. 35 A member that has a restrictive policy and does not make a commitment in a particular service sector can maintain its status quo and free ride on other members who, through time-consuming negotiations and bargains, grant each other improved access to this service sector in their jurisdictions.
36
As a matter of fact, even during the bargaining, Members may try to free ride on each other, as was alleged in the context of the financial services and telecommunications negotiations. 37 Each of the beneficiaries of a concession from a trading partner may be tempted to understate their willingness to pay for it, hoping that offers of reciprocal concessions from other There is yet another possible free-riding problem when MFN "spills" out of WTO. Members will be sufficient to induce the concession.... This was reflected in the unwillingness in some of the services negotiations of some Members to make binding commitments unless a certain 'critical mass' of Members was willing to make significant liberalization commitments. 38 Thus, free-rider concern seems to be the major driving force of Members taking actions to claim MFN exemption. There are at least two other reasons. First, when GATS came into force a number of countries already had preferential agreements in services that they had signed with trading partners, either bilaterally or in small groups.
39 WTO members felt it was necessary to maintain these preferences temporarily. They gave themselves the right to continue giving more favorable treatment to particular countries in particular service activities by listing "MFN exemptions" alongside their first sets of conunitments.° Second, "[c]ertain sectoral sensitivities that emerged in the Uruguay Round raised the specter of wholesale sectoral exclusions from GATS as a means of avoiding the MFN rule. In order to prevent this, it was agreed to permit limited exemptions to MFN under GATS."' 1 It became clear during the Uruguay Round that "unqualified liberalization in some service sectors could not be achieved, and that liberalization subject to some temporary MFN exceptions would be preferable to no liberalization at all." ' 42 According to the Secretariat, GATS rules including the one-time MFN exemption provide remarkable flexibility that allows governments, to a great extent, to determine the level of obligations they will assume. 43 "It was this flexibility in the scheduling of commitments which put an end to the north-south controversy over services which marked the early years of the Uruguay Round." ' There are at least three other main elements of remarkable flexibility in GATS: (1) complete freedom to choose which services to commit, i.e., to guarantee access to foreign suppliers; (2) for those services that are committed, the ability to set limitations specifying the level of market access and the degree of national treatment they are prepared to guarantee; and (3) the ablity to limit commitments, or withdraw and negotiate commitments, to one or more of the four recognized "modes of supply" through which services 38. Id. [Vol. 13:1 PIERCING THE VEIL OF CHINA'S LEGAL MARKET are traded. 4 " In this sense, GATS is a product of compromise. 46 However, as the first set of legally-enforceable rules covering international trade in services, GATS rules do have teeth. One important bite comes from the socalled "specific commitment" approach.
See Trading Into the
Specific commitments are individual countries' commitments to open markets in specific sectors. 47 The commitments appear in "schedules" that list the sectors being opened, the extent of market access being given in those sectors (e.g. whether there are any restrictions on foreign ownership), and any limitations on national treatment (whether some rights granted to local companies will not be granted to foreign companies). 48 National treatment is thus treated differently for services than for goods (GATT) and intellectual property (TRIPS) 49 where national treatment is a general principle. In GATS, national treatment is a "specific commitment"--one of the negotiated rights/obligations-and only applies where a country has made a specific commitment, and exemptions are allowed. 5°T hese commitments on national treatment and market access are "bound"'" and, "like bound tariffs, they can only be modified or withdrawn after negotiations with affected countries, which would probably lead to compensation. Because "unbinding" is difficult, the commitments are virtually guaranteed conditions for foreign exporters and importers of services and investors in the sector to do business." 2 In light of the keen concerns over deregulation and threat to democracy, it is unfair to expect GATS to achieve the same extent of liberalization as the GATT has done over half a century.
53 "IThe Uruguay Round services package is only a beginning," 54 and, as such, the primary gain in the first round of commitments consisted of commitments not to increase protectionism (standstill commitments), rather than major advances in trade liberalization. 55 In consideration of this, in contrast to GATT 1947, GATS incorporates not only specific commitments to prevent further trade restrictions but also the requirement to engage in ongoing rounds of negotiations for progressive liberalization.
56
B. Trade in Legal Services: Special Dilemma Created by Unconditional MFN
As discussed above, only those nations who have chosen legal services to commit are bound to accept the GATS rules as applied to the legal services sector. 5 However, "the legal profession has unique characteristics arising from its role as intermediary between the citizen and the law and between the citizen and the state. At their core, the activities of the legal profession involve the execution of public duties, not the trade of services." ' 58 Therefore, legal service negotiators face a special dilemma created by an inherent tension between the GATS approach, unconditional MFN, and intense national concerns about reciprocity in negotiations involving legal services, thanks to the mandatory extension of any bilaterally negotiated benefits under MFN principle. 9 As the Secretariat puts it, "[tihe main obstacle to trade in legal services is represented by the predominantly national character of the law and by the national character of legal education."'°T he legal profession was originally organized around courts with lawyers' conventional role being representation before a court and each bar associated to a specific local court. 6 Thus, local court/local bar/local lawyer had been a paradigm before the emergence of a new class of lawyers known as transactional lawyers who advise on matters involving transactions, relationships and disputes not necessarily entailing court proceedings. 62 The legal profession has been further internationalized, driven by corporate clients who do business across borders and choose to rely on the services of professionals who are already familiar with their business and can guarantee high quality services. [Vol. 13:1 PIERCING THE VEIL OF CHINA'S LEGAL MARKET Legal services, for the purpose of GATS, include any advisory (counseling) or (court) representation service which is supplied on a commercial basis or in competition with one or more service suppliers.' "Completely excluded from the scope of the GATS are services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority, defined as services supplied neither on a commercial basis, nor in competition with one or more service suppliers." 5 In the WTO's Services Sectorial Classification List, "legal services" is listed as a sub-sector of "business services" and "professional services." ' This entry corresponds to the UN CPC No. 861 in the United Nations Provisional Central Product Classification. 67 This classification, however, does not reflect the reality of trade in legal services. 68 In scheduling GATS commitments, Members have preferred "to adopt the following distinctions to express different degrees of market openness in legal services: (a) host country law (advisory/representation); (b) home country law and/or third country law (advisory/representation); (c) international law (advisory/representations); (d) legal documentation and certification services; (e) other advisory and information services." 69 Like all services, there are four modes of supply of legal services: (1) cross-border supply when a legal service crosses a national frontier; (2) consumption abroad-when Member's residents purchase legal services in the territory of another Member; (3) commercial presence, i.e., involving foreign direct investment; and (4) proposed subcategories would provide the members with a clear mechanism through which to limit the practice of "host-country law (representation services)" to local practitioners, but make substantial commitments through other subcategories, thus protecting the "public function" as well as providing meaningful market access to foreign legal practitioners. See id.
providers or employees of a multinational firm move to and stay in, temporarily, another country to provide legal service. 7 " Legal services were first included in the GATS negotiations at the insistence of the United States in the Uruguay Round Negotiation. 7 In the Uruguay Round, 45 members (counting the then 12 Member States of the EU as one) made commitments in legal services. Two acceding members also included legal services in their schedule. Of these 47 members, 22 made commitments in advisory host country law (19 in representation), 41 in advisory international law (20 in representation), 40 in advisory home country law (20 in representation) 41 in advisory third country law and 6 in other legal services (including legal documentation and certification services and other advisory and information services). 72 U.S. negotiators initially envisioned a special annex on legal services, similar to the Annex on Financial Services, to specifically address the regulatory barriers facing lawyers. Under the terms of the GATS, obligations of such an annex would be binding on all GATS members and would have required all GATS members to afford foreign lawyers some uniform minimum level of access to their legal markets. 73 Because an Annex is an integral part of the Agreement, binding on all members for the covered sector, the creation of an Annex on legal services, the argument went on, could have eased the inherent tension between the GATS approach and the national concerns. 74 The final version of the GATS expressly rejected the "Special Annex" approach initially envisioned by U.S. negotiators and, instead, adopted the multilateral negotiation process for the opening of legal markets. 75 The multilateral negotiation approach permits members to offer improved access to their legal markets in exchange for concessions from other Members-not [Vol. 13:1 PIERCING THE VEIL OF CHINA'S LEGAL MARKET limited within the context of the legal service sector per se, rather, on a more comprehensive service arena, or even across goods, services, investment and intellectual property." Due to the trade-off feature of such market access negotiations, among the forty-five members, no two Schedules of specific commitments are the same.
See Guide to Reading the GATS Schedules of Specific Commitments and the List of Article (MFN) Exemptions
77 A member might want to trade more freedom in its legal market for a similar benefit in another service sector of another member, which it thinks more significant. As a result, the level of liberalization actually achieved in legal services will vary from country to country, "depending on the outcome of various 'horse trades' during the negotiation process." 78 Still, because offers in the legal service sector are hard to assess due to lack of dependable data and complexity of national regulatory systems, 79 "legal services suffer from being invariably at the bottom of the [negotiation] agenda." 
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In response to Members' demand to open up its legal market during the "requests and offers" procedure, 83 the 1994 schedule4 was revised in November 1997 to embody the "legal services" as a sub-sector of "professional services" sector, subject to the MFN exemption based on reciprocity." Trade in legal services, most significantly, the establishment of business offices of law firms (i.e. the mode 3 of legal service) would be on the basis of reciprocity. s6 National authorities are very reluctant to tolerate asymmetric access to legal markets, so reciprocity is actually a shared concern. s7 However, a network of reciprocity provisions in domestic regulations will result in "lowest common denominator liberalization," in which the willingness of the most restrictive country to liberalize its domestic rules decide the pace of actual liberalization. 8 Chinese negotiators formally gave up the MFN exemption during the accession negotiations. 89 Only a few days into the WTO fraternity, the central government has already released a new set of regulations in carrying out its WTO commitments. ' 
See id.
It is important to distinguish between reciprocity as an aspect of the bargaining process and reciprocity as an aspect of the trade regime. In the former case, concessions are negotiated on a reciprocal basis and the results are multilateralized, so discrimination is not practiced in actual trade. In the latter case, reciprocity is the basis for the implementation of trade policy, so discrimination is a feature of actual trade policy. Were there any other reasons that China was so concerned about reciprocity? What then prompted it to withdraw the MFN exemption? This section is to address these questions from a historic perspective.
A. Unequal Treaty System in Colonialism Era
To offset serious balance of payments problems for the British purchase of tea and silk, Britain (with U.S. support) fought the Opium Wars of the mid19th Century (1839-42 and 1856-60) for the unlimited right to sell opium to the Chinese. 93 Britain's victory over China in the Opium Wars created an "unequal treaties" system, in which China was forced to grant unilateral MFN status 94 in the treaties between China and foreign powers including the United States. 95 The treaties typically stated that: the contracting parties hereby agree that should at any time the Ta-Tsing Empire grant to any nation, or the merchants or citizens of any nations, any right, privilege, or favor connected either with navigation, commerce, political or other intercourse which is not conferred by this Treaty, such right, privilege, and favor shall at once freely enure to the benefit of the United States, its public officers, merchants, and citizens. 96 In these unequal treaties, China was required to impose tariffs fixed by treaty obligations without any equivalent tariff concessions, and China did not receive any equivalent grant of MNF from Great Britain, the United States or other foreign powers.
97 "This lack of reciprocity attained by the MFN clauses in the unequal treaties is reflected in China's modem day concern for reciprocity in foreign relations" as discussed below in more detail. 98 The history of unequal treaties combined with Marxist ideology, viewing trade between developing and industrialized countries primarily as a form of exploration, led Communist China to de-emphasize trade in the twentieth century. 99 However, China continued to grant MFN status in the 1950's and 1960's, but only to friendly nations such as Yemen, the Soviet Union, Albania, Mongolia, Korea, and Vietnam. " "In China's history, trade and politics have been interwoven from the earliest times, and may so continue."O ' ' The use of MFN by China in treaties with its allies illustrates the connection between MFN and politics. 2 The United States' practice is no exception.
B. United States' Conditional MFN Practice
Under conditional MFN practices, if country A owes MFN treatment to B, it is then obligated to grant B the same privilege it grants to C, but only after B has given A some reciprocal privilege to "pay for it."' 3 The United States pursued a "conditional MFN" policy prior to World War I and changed to an unconditional policy in 1923.' However, "there are ample situations which have occurred... that suggest the possibility that the United States has gradually moved away from its earlier adamant support of MFN and multilateralism toward a more 'pragmatic' approach of dealing with trading partners on a bilateral basis and of 'rewarding friends."' 10'
One of the earliest post-1945 departures from MFN by the United States was its exclusion of communist countries from such treatment in 1951.1'6 In the Tokyo Round (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) , the United States also took some steps that departed from unconditional MFN.' 07 The U.S. Congress mandated in the 1974 Trade Act that the United States try to offset the "free-rider" problem, at least for industrial countries, by withholding MFN treatment from certain countries if they did not provide reciprocal advantages as a result of [Vol. 13:1 negotiation. ' 08 In addition, the United States has refused to give unconditional MFN status to all GATT members in connection with the obligations of three of the Tokyo Round Codes,"° out of the same concern about the "free-rider" problem and the need to provide an incentive for countries to enter into the discipline of the Codes." 0 In trade in services, the United States listed MFN exemption for the licensing of foreign financial service suppliers on the basis of reciprocity, although the exemption is very narrow and applicable only against countries in which United States financial institutions were forced to disinvest on the basis of their nationality." ' However, maybe nothing is as controversial as the way the United States has dealt with China, which has generated a great sense of bitterness among the Chinese people whose task for more than a century has been ending the era of national humiliation. 20, 20 (1994) 
D. Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNPR)
China's prospective WTO membership raised a critical issue about how the United States will handle China's MFN status under U.S. law. The U.S. government realized that the temporary (conditional) MFN under JacksonVanik would conflict with the WTO obligation to provide unconditional MFN to WTO members on a permanent basis,' and the United States would have to either remove China from Title IV's coverage or invoke the "nonapplication clause" of WTO Article XIII. ' Article XIII of the agreement establishing the WTO permits either a WTO member or an incoming member to refuse to apply WTO commitments to one another. 4 in case of the United States invoking "non-application" against China, the Sino-U.S. business dealings would continue under the 1979 U.S.-China bilateral agreement under which China is obligated to provide the U.S. MFN treatment, but only in the areas mentioned.' 35 Therefore, since the 1979 agreement (which provides for "reciprocal" MFN status' 36 between the two countries) does not establish clear MFN obligations for services and service suppliers,' 37 the net effect would be that American lawyers would not be entitled to any benefits China would have offered to lawyers from other WTO members. Furthermore, none of the bilateral agreements between the United States and China provide for binding multilateral dispute settlement, as do the WTO agreements. It is in the interest of the United States, including American law firms, to grant China permanent MFN. "Since the Jackson-Vanik amendment provision only allows a 1 year waiver of Title IV restrictions and Congress can disapprove the waiver, the [Clinton] administration plans to ask Congress to enact legislation that would remove China from title IV's coverage."'" In October 2000, the legislation was passed providing the President with discretionary authority to grant permanent MFN, now known'as normal trade relations, to China after certifying that the terms and conditions for the accession of the People's Republic of China to the WTO were at least equivalent to those agreed between the United States and China on November
15, 1999.141
On Besides, it became more and more clear that China would soon obtain the WTO membership. "Once China becomes a member of the WTO, the concerns over reciprocity may subside because China has achieved equal footing with other contracting parties. GATT MFN allows some flexibility in equal treatment by allowing countries to bargain for preferences, thus supporting an element of reciprocity in tariff negotiations."'" This may have helped China overcome its MFN syndrome. From reciprocity-based-MFN to unconditional "MFN," the history of foreign law firms in making inroads into China is just a vivid snapshot of this historic transition.
E. The Right of Establishment of Foreign Law Firms in China 1. Historical Perspective
Where business goes, lawyers follow. With the initiation of reform and open-door policies, foreign investment in China blossomed and created great demand for legal services. 5 ' However, China's legal profession did not arrive on the social scene until August 26, 1980, when the Fifteenth Session of the Standing Committee of the Fifth National People's Congress passed the "Tentative Regulations on Lawyers in People's Republic of China," which laid the foundation for development of the legal profession in China.' Even then, it was still impossible for foreign lawyers to obtain official access to China, not to mention permanent presence, because lawyers were defined as "state legal workers"' 52 under the "Tentative Regulations" and the legal profession was rather politically delicate in nature. 3 Nevertheless, foreign law firms still managed to make inroads into China in various forms. In August 1979, as counsel to its then client Amoco, 
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Coudert Brothers opened its Beijing office where it also carried out business under its own name.I" It is believed to be the first-ever foreign law firm to provide legal service within the jurisdiction of China. 5 The Chinese government obviously felt the pinch and started to research the possibilities of licensing foreign law firms. Delegations were sent to Singapore, Hong Kong, and European countries in 1986.158 Unfortunately, the June 4, 1989, student protest in Tiananmen Squire and the ensuing political firestorm brought all the on-going preparation to a halt. Foreign investment shrank and the law firms with already established consulting offices in China started to withdraw from the China market. 5 9 It was only three years later, on July 1, 1992, when the State Council formally authorized the Ministry of Justice ("MoJ") to start the licensing of foreign law firms on a trial basis. " The "beauty contest" turned out so fierce that some firms could no longer wait for an official approval and were "sending lawyers to work out of hotel suites on a project-by-project basis, or opening up full-blown unapproved offices."'' Coudert Brothers (USA), Adams (France), Denton Hall (England), Lovell White Durrant (England), Licasiri & Co (Hong Kong), and eight other firms were among the first lucky law firms who were officially granted the right of establishment.' 62 [Vol. 13:1 PIERCING THE VEIL OF CHINA'S LEGAL MARKET branches. 63 They spouted in Beijing (52), Shanghai (48), Guangzhou (11), Shenzhen (2), Suzhou (1), Qingdao (1), Tianjin (1), Dalian (1), Fuzhou (1) and Chengdu (1) respectively.' 4 The experimental licensing program has entered into its tenth year. Lacking clear guidelines, the "historically arduous"' 65 licensing process has been, by and large, subject to MoJ's discretion. There seems to be little pattern in the awarding of licenses. " The practice has aroused many controversies and has been attacked on the basis of transparency.' 67 Law firms desperate to secure a license have to learn from others' experience as a more reliable guideline. A law review article summarized "building relations with" and "doing quite a few favors for government officials" as the keys to the success of a medium-sized U.S. firm (Altheimer & Gray See Information Paper, supra note 1, at 6. According to an MOFTEC (instead of MoJ) official, the approval issued by the MoJ is mainly based upon the following considerations: (1) the size, strength and track record of the applicant firm in the country of origin or over the world; (2) the volume of business in the PRC handled by the applicant firm; (3) the relationship between the applicant firm's country of origin and the PRC; and (4) the principle of reciprocity, i.e., whether the applicant firm's country of origin would allow foreign law firms to set up offices in that country. 
The regulations, all centered around Mode 3 of legal services, i.e. commercial presence, laid down a Licensing ("Pi Zhun"), Registration ("Deng Ji Zhu Ce") and Annual Report system for the foreign law firms exploring ways to set up outposts in China. ' 73 Under the system, a foreign law firm must obtain a license from MoJ before opening an office.' 74 The awarding of licenses was governed by principle of reciprocity, i.e., China will grant the right of establishment only to those firms whose home country grants Chinese firms the same right. ' To substantiate the "reciprocity" principle of the Provisional Regulations, the Detailed Regulations required a foreign law firm provide documents certifying that its home country permits establishment of liaison offices by law firms from other countries including China. ' 76 Furthermore, the aspiring law firm must not only possess the competence in bringing in foreign investment but also has been friendly to China.' This is consistent with China's historical treaties granting MFN in the 1950's and 1060's to its allies. '
MoJ is the government agency with primary jurisdiction over administration, supervision and inspection of foreign law firms in setting up representative offices. ' 79 MoJ authorizes its local Departments/Bureaus, at the level of the provinces, autonomous regions and cities directly under the Central Government where the representative offices are to be located, to administer, supervise and inspect the representative offices as going concerns. 80 The MoJ had levied certain restrictions on foreign law firms:
a. Legal Forms
In terms of the legal forms, foreign law firms may only set up "Representative Office(s)" in China, ' [Vol. 13:1 PIERCING THE VEIL OF CHINA'S LEGAL MARKET be borne directly by the foreign law firms. ' Foreign law firms cannot engage in legal services under the disguised form of "consulting firms" or "commercial firms" to sidestep the license and registration requirements.' 3
b. Practice Areas
The most rigid limitations are on practice areas. Representative Offices are prohibited from interpreting Chinese law, representing clients on Chinese law matters or engaging in other activities which are precluded from foreigners,'" although they may accept assignments from Chinese clients or Chinese law firms for legal matters related to the home country or any third country where they are officially qualified, and they can act as agents for foreign clients and in turn hire Chinese law firms to handle legal matters in China. 85 
c. Local Hiring
Representative Offices are prohibited from hiring Chinese lawyers." 6 Under the Notice, it seems that foreign law firms are prohibited from hiring not only Chinese "licensed" lawyers, but also any person who has passed the National Bar Examination"' and is thus domestically "qualified."' ' 88 Notwithstanding the prohibition against hiring Chinese lawyers, in practice Representative Offices commonly recruit law graduates, many of who have passed the national bar and thus are qualified under Chinese law, as legal assistants or legal secretaries. 8 9 Even licensed Chinese lawyers often show up on the payrolls, but theoretically they have to forfeit their right to practice Chinese law. 9 is unclear what exactly the term "Chinese lawyers" mean. The "Notice" and "Detailed Regulation" evidenced the consciousness on the part of the drafters of the distinction between a "Chinese licensed lawyer" and a "Chinese citizen with qualification to practice law." According to Article 5 of the "PRC Lawyers' Law," one has to be both qualified and licensed before he can practice law. The usual way to get qualified is to pass the National Bar Exam, and a license is issued only following an administrative review.
187. See Press Release, Establishment and Enforcement of the National Uniform Judicial Examination (Feb. 7,2002) , available at http://www.china.org.cn/e-news/news02-02-7.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2002) . The national bar examination, which was put in place in 1986, is now incorporated into the national judicial qualification examination. See id.
188. See Notice, supra note 172, art. IX(a). 189. It is the author's opinion that this becomes a common method of localization by the Representative Offices in staffing their Chinese deals.
190. See discussion, infra Part E(b)(7). In China, licenses are technically granted to law firms rather than individual lawyers.
2002] d. Geographic Limitation
The pilot program of licensing foreign law firms is geographically limited. At first only in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Hainan 9 " could Representative Offices be set up.' 92 e. Quantitative Limitation Known as the "One Firm, One Office" rule, the rule mandates that each foreign law firm may only have one Representative Office in China. 3 Legal services may not be provided under the camouflage of another name, such as "consulting firm.""'
Qualification Requirements
As a practical matter, although there is no written provision, the approval authority has applied certain "seasoning requirements" in licensing foreign law firms.' 95 For example, the chief representative and others must have at least three years of practicing experience, and no representative may have been subject to professional discipline at their local bar. ' 96 Furthermore, the chief representative must be admitted in the country where the law firm is headquartered. 197. See Gu, supra note 161, at 201-02 n.306. This is a rather peculiar provision.
However, one European law firm which, thanks to the very provision, was forced to replace an American lawyer as its chief representative. See id. This requirement was later changed to require a chief representative to be a partner of a law firm of a WTO Member. [Vol. 13:1
PIERCING THE VEIL OF CHINA'S LEGAL MARKET f Disciplinary Rules 98
For any violation of the "Provisional Regulations," MoJ or its authorized local agencies may impose a disciplinary warning, or either suspend or revoke a license. Similarly, the SAIC and its local agencies may impose fines, confiscate illegal gains or annul the registration. "' For instance, both Coudert Brother and Baker & Mackenzie received a violation notice and had to close their "illegal" Shanghai shops in 19952° for violating the "onecity rule" discussed below. 2 "'
The lack of transparency of Provisional Regulations inevitably led to misunderstanding. For instance, in 1996, to ascertain the effect of the tentative licensing program, Beijing Bureau of Justice conducted a "feasibility study" of Representative Offices' business performance.
2 0 2 The study elicited, among other things, certain information about the clients of these Representative Offices. The U.S. lawyers, constrained by strict ethical canons, were extremely concerned that their lawyer-client privilege had been jeopardized. 3 Rumors loomed large that MoJ was to mandate the disclosure of a broad range of confidential information including the clients' names, the location and nature of the clients' projects and the amount of investment behind the projects. 2 ' MoJ later clarified that no clients' names were to be disclosed. However, the exaggerated response of U.S. lawyers frustrated MoJ as well. As a matter of fact, the notion of attorney-client privilege is by no means an international one. For instance, the International Court of Justice held in Am & S Europe Ltd. v. Commission that a U.S. lawyer representing an E.U. client might be forced to produce an otherwise privileged document to the client government. 2 5 The U.S. lawyer, according to the holding, could not claim attorney-client privilege since the privilege applies only to lawyers governed by professional ethics within the E.U.
1
Any similar disputes after China's entry into WTO might soon be subject to WTO dispute panels. 7 As proposed, a domestic regulation, like the one in our case, "relating to qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements," ' 2°' once challenged, may have to meet certain necessity tests. 2° The regulators may have to prove that the objective of the challenged regulation is "legitimate" according to WTO rules and that the regulation is the "least trade restrictive. ' It would be up to certain trade experts, instead of "democratically-elected governments," to decide what is "legitimate" and what is "unnecessarily restrictive," and this worries people. 1 There is an open question with respect to individual foreign lawyers' capacity to enter into China's legal market. It is noticeable that Chinese licensing is firm-based, which means that individuals who pass the national bar exam are qualified, but must still acquire sponsorship from a firm to receive their licenses. 1 2
The Provisional Regulations are reluctant to recognize these foreign lawyers' "lawyer" status. Rather, the Staff of Representative Offices is referred to as "members," reflecting the regulator's consciousness of the national characteristics of the legal profession and the built-in sensitivity of the socialist legal system. 21 There is also no "Foreign Legal Consultant" (FLC) system present. Therefore, an individual U.S. lawyer is simply not eligible to practice in China. A U.S. lawyer can, however, provide legal services (exclusive of Chinese law) from the United States into China or within the United States to a Chinese customer because China did not schedule mode 1, "Cross-border," and mode 2, "consumption abroad," of trade in legal services. 214 And, of course, solo practitioners can penetrate by first setting up a law firm in the United States and then initiating the application on the firm's behalf." 5 207. See Woodroffe, supra note 15, at 26. The Working Party on Domestic Regulation is currently discussing certain proposals under Article VI:4 of GATS. See id. "If such proposals were accepted, they would increase the reach of GATS right into the heart of government decision-making." Id.
208. GATS, supra note 24, art. VI(4 [Vol. 13:1 Since GATS applies to four different modes of supplying services, extending equal treatment to services which are "like" one another means that Chinese regulators cannot discriminate against firms which supply legal services in these different ways. 2 " 6 IV. How ACCESSIBLE IS THE CHINESE LEGAL MARKET Now?
A. China's Commitments in Legal Services
In November 1999, the United States and China reached an agreement on China's commitment to open its services sector. China agreed to open nine of its twelve service sectors-including legal services-to foreign service providers, though with some specified limitations. 21 7 The negotiation between China and the United States was widely considered as the most significant obstacle to China membership. Foreign Representative Offices may now enter into contracts to maintain "long-term entrustment relations" with Chinese law firms for legal affairs,
228
as was first achieved in the 1999 U.S.-China Trade Pact. 229 Such entrustment would allow the foreign representative offices to directly instruct lawyers in the entrusted Chinese law firm, as agreed between both parties. 230 Furthermore, they are allowed to provide information on the "impact of the Chinese legal environment., 2 3 '
According to the Final Schedule, China offers to give legal service providers from all WTO members the specified market access and national treatment, subject only to certain limitations. For example, "legal form limitation," "business scope limitation," and "experience requirements" are market access limitations; "residence requirement" and "restriction on local hiring" are national treatment limitations; and "presence of natural persons" is both. 232
Legal Form Limitation
Foreign law firms may provide legal services in China only in the form of Representative Offices, 233 i.e., they can not incorporate in forms of limited liability companies. Under GATS, the government can not maintain such market access restriction unless so specified in the schedule. 234 "Countries often justify the restriction of incorporation on public policy grounds, and in particular, to ensure that professionals do not limit their professional responsibilities and liabilities. 235 
Business Scope
Chinese law practice by foreign firms will still be prohibited. 236 For Chinese legal affairs, foreign representative offices may entrust only Chinese law firms to deal with Chinese legal affairs on behalf of foreign clients. 237 Therefore, a foreign law firm's representative office may only provide legal services on the law of its home country, international law and the law of a third country where the lawyers of the representative office are qualified. 238 The nationality-based business limitation ensures that only Chinese nationals can practice domestic law. According to the Secretariat on Legal Services, nationality requirements in legal services are actually quite common, especially for notarial services, representation services (in all fields of law) and other sectors which involve "public function." ' 239 Socialist China's stake is especially high. Despite the reclassification of Chinese lawyers from "state legal worker" to "legal service provider" under the 1996 Lawyers' Law, 24° the legal profession per se is still rather delicate and politically sensitive. 24 " '
Experience Requirements
The chief representative shall be a partner, or equivalent, 242 of a foreign law firm with practicing experience of at least three consecutive years (five years in the 1997 Schedule) in a country or region where he is admitted. 43 Other representatives shall be members of the bar of a country or region where they shall have practiced for at least two consecutive years (three years in the 1997 Schedule). 4 It seems that the requirements were meant to protect domestic consumers by preventing foreign law firms from staffing the representative offices with junior attorneys. 245 
Presence of Natural Persons
In this regard, the Final Schedule provides "unbound except as indicated in horizontal commitments." 24 In the horizontal commitments, natural persons are subject to the immigration regulations and other relevant regulations regarding the entry and temporary stay of foreigners. 247 The effect of this "unbound" banner is that China will reserve its regulation power on the presence of natural persons, mainly by immigration methods. 24 Listing such a condition in its Schedule is critical since, under GATS, it would otherwise be considered a violation of the "national treatment" provision. National treatment under GATS means de facto equal treatment between domestic and foreign service providers, meaning treating foreign vendors "no less favourable [sic] than that it accords to its own like services and service suppliers." 249 "A measure or treatment, whether formally identical or formally different, shall be considered to be less favorable (and thus violating GATS principle) if it modifies the conditions of competition in favor of domestic services or service suppliers." ' It follows that unintentional regulative actions may constitute de facto discrimination if it leads to discriminatory effects. 2 5 ' In this way, GATS explicitly includes in the text the issue that has only been developed in previous WTO agreements like GATT through legal dispute cases." 2 The rough test of de facto discrimination and the current round of GATS renegotiation, by placing additional constraints on "domestic regulation," pose the most serious new threats to democracy. 253
Residence Requirement
In order to counter the under-staffing phenomena in which everyday operations are maintained by a secretary with called-on assistance from "fly by night" lawyers, 254 all representatives shall be resident in China for no less than six months each year. 255 The 180-day residence may qualify the resident attorneys for income tax purposes. 2 6 executives and specialists defined as senior employees who are engaged in foreign invested enterprises within China, of a corporation of other GATS members, are permitted a long-term entry as stipulated in the terms of contracts concerned or an initial stay of three years, whichever is shorter. 
Restrictions on Hiring Chinese National Registered Lawyers 2 7
Representative offices shall not employ "Chinese national registered lawyers" outside of China. 258 This hiring restriction and restriction on partnership with local law firms are undivided parts of the above-mentioned restriction on host country law practice. Otherwise, by employing or associating with locally qualified lawyers, foreign law firms could circumvent the restriction on Chinese law practice and expand into the fields of representation before a court.
259
B. Remaining Business
Although China is poised to play by international rules, this is not the end of the story. There remain at least three issues worth discussing:
How "like" is "like?"
Both the awarding of MFN and national treatment and the imposition of a "public order exception" are to be awarded to "like services and service suppliers." 26 Since GATS applies to four different modes of supplying services: cross border, consumption abroad, commercial presence, and the presence of natural persons extending equal treatment to services which are like to each other means that governments cannot discriminate amongst companies which supply services in these different ways. 26 ' Since standards and qualifications are unlikely to be exactly the same in any two countries, the question is how much differencejustifies a pronouncement of unlikeness? For instance, how real is the difference between civil law and common law as reflected in lawyering and legal market?
The most appropriate basis for comparing services shall be a "notion that is related to the economically meaningful concepts of directly competitive or substitutable and follows the logic of the market place." ' 62 This is the notion of "end uses," meaning whether consumers treat the services in question as substitutes. 263 China is enacting a new law on property rights during which two schools of thought, modeled after civil law and the Anglo-American system respectively, are fiercely competing with each other for front page. 2 " The civil law school, rooted in the Roman law idea of dominium, i.e., absolute right over a thing, defines property as the ownership of things, moveable and immovable, while excluding from "property" in a legal sense any other kind of economic right. 265 The Anglo-American school notices the actual functions of property in industrial society where parties who have acquired the economic substance, but not the legal title, are increasingly exercising actual control functions. 2 " It will be interesting to witness the impact that this statute, or the clients' choices, has on foreign lawyers and their practice. 267
"Public order" and "Security" exceptions to MFN
While the maintenance of public order is not an objective listed in the general exceptions provision of GATT' 1994,268 the difference between goods and services sectors, and especially the sensitive national character of trade in legal services, necessitates such an exception in trade in legal services. Under GATS, Members are not prevented from adopting or enforcing any measures that are "necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order," 269 or taking any action that "it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests." 70 However, the public order exception may be invoked "only where a genuine and sufficiently serious threat is posed to one of the fundamental interests of society,"" and shall not be applied in a manner which will constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade in services. 272 262. See Mattoo, supra note 33, at 21. "With the exception of general principles underlying broad doctrines such as the 'common law' or 'civil law,' legal rules are jurisdictionspecific," ' 273 and they are based on different ideological values and social regimes. It seems only natural that legal regulators would require foreign service vendors to ensure respect for the core values of the host society. 274 Arguments aside, Chinese regulators are extremely concerned about any attempt to undermine its socialist national security. Thus, it shall not be a surprise that criminal defense of suspects indicted with violations of "national security" be precluded from foreign legal experts. 275 
Domestic Regulation and Self-Regulation
Although domestic regulatory measures (measures relating to qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements) are not subject to scheduling under Articles XVI and XVII, 276 many members have scheduled them in the legal services sector. 277 Most of these measures are licensing and qualification requirements. 278 GATS mandates that "[m]embers shall not apply licensing and qualification requirements and technical standards that nullify or impair [any existing sectoral] commitments in a manner which ... could not reasonably have been expected of that Member at the time the specific commitments in those sectors were made. '279 In the extreme, this provision could be read as "grandfathering" all existing restrictive requirements. 28 0 To ensure that any domestic regulation measures "do not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in services," GATS calls upon the Council for Trade in Services to develop any necessary disciplines. 28 ' Pending the entry into force of any such discipline, "each Member shall ensure that all measures of general application affecting trade in services are administered in a reasonable, objective, and impartial manner. ' is an "unnecessary barrier" and what is "reasonable, objective, and impartial?" The fact that trade experts, instead of democratically-elected representatives, have the final say worries many." 3 On the other hand, for governments to avoid unnecessary confrontation with other Members on domestic regulation, it is probably wise to rely more on self-regulation to achieve the same policy goals. There have been proposals suggesting that the government delegate the regulation power to the All-China Lawyer Association and subject foreign lawyers to the same disciplines as Chinese lawyers. 2 a It is believed that these proposals, like many basic ideas behind the current regulatory measures, draw fire from Japanese models, the one with the most restrictive force. 285 Although self-regulation may help shift the burden and criticism away, 286 the regulators can not play ostrich as to the professional codes the bar associations come up with. 287 For the first time in a multilateral agreement, it is recognized that "certain business practices" of service suppliers may restrain competition and thereby restrict trade in services. 2 " 8 Therefore, Members have a general obligation to consult on such practices when so requested by another member, and to exchange information with a view to eliminate them. 289 
IV. CONCLUSION: IN THE WAKE OF WTO ACCESSION
China's offer in legal services is far less than adequate from other members' point of view. 9 However, since members have placed priority on issues of financial services and telecommunications rather than legal services,
